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Abstract. Individuals who are unaware of the price do not derive more 
enjoyment from more expensive wine. In a sample of more than 6,000 blind 
tastings, we find that the correlation between price and overall rating is small 
and negative, suggesting that individuals on average enjoy more expensive 
wines slightly less. For individuals with wine training, however, we find 
indications of a positive relationship between price and enjoyment. Our results 
are robust to the inclusion of individual fixed effects, and are not driven by 
outliers: when omitting the top and bottom deciles of the price distribution, our 
qualitative results are strengthened, and the statistical significance is improved 
further. Our results indicate that both the prices of wines and wine 
recommendations by experts may be poor guides for non-expert wine 
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Introduction 
When symbolic content is an important part of consumption, the enjoyment of a 
good might become decoupled from its innate qualities. The symbolic content 
of a price tag has been emphasized in marketing research (e.g., Cialdini, 1998). 
At the same time, when goods with similar characteristics differ in price, a 
reasonable prior is that the more expensive good will, on average, be of a higher 
quality. People have been shown to expect a positive correlation between price 
and quality (e.g., Rao and Monroe, 1989). Consistent with this expectation, a 
meta-analysis reports positive correlations between price and quality ratings for 
most, but not all, of 1,200 product markets, but also finds that the range of these 
correlations is very large (Tellis and Wernerfelt, 1987). 
    For some goods, there is much heterogeneity in consumer tastes, making it 
harder to infer quality from revealed preferences. Nonetheless, a reasonable 
prior is that consumers on average will derive more enjoyment from the good 
with the higher price. Previous research suggests that wine might be a good 
where consumer tastes are highly heterogeneous (Amerine and Roessler, 1976; 
Lecocq and Visser, 2006). While individuals may frequently disagree over 
which wine they prefer, the above hypothesis suggests a positive correlation 
between the enjoyment of a wine and its price. 
    Many factors, such as peer consumption and marketing actions, can influence 
how a good is experienced. Price may in itself be such a factor. Recent research 
has shown that individuals appreciate the same wine more when they think that 
it is more expensive (Brochet, 2001; Plassmann et al., 2008). In other words, 
the price of a good affects the experienced utility derived from that good. Thus, 
to test the conjecture mentioned above, we need to examine the enjoyment of 
wine when individuals are unaware of the price. 
    In this paper, we use a large sample of more than 6,000 US blind tastings, 
compiled by food and wine critic Robin Goldstein. Blind tastings offer the 
opportunity to isolate the experience of the wine itself from psychological 
confounds related to its price, presentation or published expert ratings.     We investigate the relationship between price and subjective appreciation of 
wines, when the price is unknown to the tasters. Subjective appreciation is 
measured by overall ratings assigned to wines by individual participants. 
    Our main finding is that, on average, individuals who are unaware of the 
price do not derive more enjoyment from more expensive wine. In fact, they 
enjoy more expensive wines slightly less. 
    We use an ordered probit estimator, as well as a linear estimator (OLS). In 
both cases, we use robust standard errors. The ordered probit estimator is 
particularly well suited to an ordinal dependent variable, but we find that OLS 
also performs well, and yields estimates that are easier to interpret. In any case, 
the two models generate highly consistent results. The dependent variable is the 
overall rating assigned by an individual to a wine. The key independent variable 
is the price of the wine, expressed as the natural logarithm of the average retail 
price per 750 mL in US dollars.
1
    In our baseline model, we regress the overall rating on the price of the wine, 
using both estimators. If individuals found that more expensive wine tasted 
better, the coefficient on price would be positive. Our baseline model allows us 
to reject this hypothesis: the coefficient on price is negative, and statistically 
significant, regardless of which of the two estimators we use. 
    Next, we extend the model by taking into account that about 12% of the 
participants in the blind tastings had some form of wine training, such as a 
sommelier course. A number of studies have reported positive correlations 
between price and subjective appreciation of a wine for wine experts (e.g., 
Oczkowski, 1994; Landon and Smith, 1997; Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; 
Schamel and Anderson, 2003; Lecocq and Visser, 2006). 
    In the extended model, we allow for the possibility that individuals with wine 
training (hereafter: “experts”) experience wines differently from non-experts. 
We include a dummy variable for being an expert, as well as an interaction term 
for price and the expert dummy. In a linear regression, this allows both the 
intercept and the slope coefficient to differ between the two groups. 
                                                 
1 If we didn't do this, we would be expecting a one dollar increase to have the same effect at the 
$5 price level as at the $50 price level. We get similar qualitative results using the dollar prices, 
but the statistical significance of the coefficients is not as good (but still significant).     Previous research suggests that non-experts may not be particularly sensitive 
to some of the refinements that are held in high esteem by wine aficionados. 
Weil (2001, 2005) uses the following experimental setup: two bottles of wine 
are poured into four containers. Tasters are then given three of the containers 
and asked to distinguish which one differs from the other two. A random guess 
has 1/3 chance of being correct. In Weil (2001), the two wines are identical 
apart from year, but one wine is from a “good” vintage, and the other from a 
“bad” vintage.
2 The tasters get it right 41% of the time – only marginally better 
than randomized guessing.
3 In Weil (2005) the wines are a reserve bottling and 
a regular bottling, from the same producer and year. The fraction of correct 
answers is merely 40%. 
    Moreover,  Weil  finds  that  even  when tasters can distinguish between the 
vintages, they are about as likely to prefer the good one as the bad one. And 
among those that can distinguish the reserve bottling from the regular bottling, 
only half prefer the reserve. In both cases, the wines differ in price by an order 
of magnitude. 
    Our data also indicates that experts, unlike non-experts, on average assign as 
high – or higher – ratings to more expensive wines. The coefficient on the 
expert*price interaction term is positive and highly statistically significant. The 
price coefficient for non-experts is negative, and about the same size as in the 
baseline model. The net coefficient on price for experts is the sum of these two 
coefficients. It is positive and marginally statistically significant. 
    The linear estimator offers an interpretation of these effects. In terms of a 100 
point scale (such as that used by Wine Spectator), the extended model predicts 
that for a wine that costs ten times more than another wine, non-experts will on 
average assign an overall rating that is about four points lower, whereas experts 
will assign an overall rating that is about seven points higher. 
                                                 
2 Weil uses pairs for which the famous wine critic Robert Parker has rated one of the bottles 
“average” to “appalling” and the other bottle “excellent” to “the finest”. 
3 All the significant difference is driven by the testers' ability to distinguish between the good 
and bad vintages from Bordeaux Pomerol.     The magnitude of these effects is moderate, but non-negligible given that 
wine prices cover a large range. In this sample alone, prices range from $1.65 to 
$150. In wine markets in general, the range is even larger. 
    We test the robustness of our results by adding individual fixed effects to our 
model. This does not affect the qualitative results, and the coefficients 
themselves change only slightly, regardless of whether we use ordered probit or 
OLS. 
    To make sure that our results are not driven by wines at the extreme ends of 
the price range, we also estimate the extended model using a reduced sample, 
omitting observations in the top and bottom deciles of the price distribution. We 
use both ordered probit and OLS, with and without individual fixed effects. We 
find the same qualitative results with the reduced sample. In fact, the effects are 
larger and the statistical significance improves even further. In other words, our 
findings are even more pronounced when looking only at mid-range price 
levels. 
    Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe our data. In 
section 3, we present our econometric model and report the regression 
estimates. We also perform a robustness check. We conclude in section 4, 




The data set contains 6,175 observations from 17 blind tastings organized by 
Robin Goldstein. The blind tastings took place in the US between April 2007 
and February 2008. In total, 506 participants tasted wine flights composed from 
523 different wines. The wines were presented in a double-blind manner, so 
that neither the person serving the wine nor the person tasting the wine knew 
the identity and/or price of the wine. Each taster assigned an overall rating to 
every wine tasted, prior to discussing the wines with the rest of the group. The 
rating was the response to the question “Overall, how do you find the wine?” 
and the available answers were “Bad”, “Okay”, “Good”, and “Great” In the data, these alternatives are coded from 1 to 4, with 1 corresponding to “Bad” 
and 4 corresponding to “Great”.
4
    The price per bottle ranged from $1.65 to $150. The prices are average retail 
prices and were obtained from www.wine-searcher.com. The wines represent a 
broad variety of types (e.g. red, white, rosé, sparkling), country origins, and 
grapes. 
    The participants were unpaid volunteers, ranging from 21 to 88 years of age. 
Selection bias is a concern with any voluntary subject pool, and we have no 
reason to think that this is an exception. It is quite likely that the sample 
contains an over-representation of highly educated individuals, and an 
overrepresentation of individuals working in the food and wine industries. 
Nonetheless, the size of the sample and the general diversity of the tasters lead 
us to hope that inference will not be too restricted. For a more extensive 




Throughout the regression analysis, we use both an ordered probit estimator and 
a linear estimator (OLS). In both cases, we consistently use robust standard 
errors. The dependent variable is the overall rating, measured on a scale from 1 
to 4, with 4 being the highest rating. The main independent variable is the price 
variable, expressed as the natural logarithm of the average retail price per 750 
mL in US dollars. 
    In Model 1, we regress the overall rating assigned to wine i, by individual j, 
on the price of the wine. About 12% of participants had some wine training, 
such as a sommelier course. In Model 2, we allow for the possibility that these 
“experts” rate wines in a different manner. We include a dummy variable for 
being an expert, as well as an interaction term for price and the expert dummy. 
In a linear regression, this allows both the intercept and the slope coefficient to 
                                                 
4 Tasters ticked one of four boxes. In about 3% of the sample, tasters ticked in between two 
boxes, suggesting a rating somewhere in between the two responses. For simplicity, we dropped 
these observations from the regression. Including them makes no difference to our qualititative 
results, and the changes to the estimates are negligible. differ for experts and non-experts. In terms of the linear specification, we can 
write these two models as 
                i i i P y ε β β + + = ) ln( 1 0                                (1) 
and
                i j i j i ij EXPERT P EXPERT P y ε β β β β + + + + = * ) ln( ) ln( 3 2 1 0  (2)
    where Pi is the price of wine i, and EXPERTj is a dummy variable indicating 
if taster j has wine training. If individuals found that more expensive wine 
tasted better, the correlation between overall rating and price would be positive. 
In our sample, this is not the case: for both the ordered probit estimates and the 
OLS estimates, the coefficient on price is negative. In Model 1, the OLS 
coefficient is about -0.04, implying that a 100% increase in ln(price) is 
associated with a 0.04 reduction in the overall rating. The negative effect for 
more expensive wines is statistically significant. 
    Unlike  the  non-experts,  experts assign as high, or even higher, ratings to 
more expensive wines. Model 2 shows that the correlation between price and 
overall rating is positive – or, at any rate, non-negative – for experts. The price 
coefficient for non-experts is still negative, of about the same size as before, 
and with greatly improved statistical significance. The coefficient on the 
ln(price)*expert interaction term is highly statistically significant (ordered 
probit p-value: 0.017; OLS p-value: 0.015). For experts, the net coefficient on 
price is the sum of the two, i.e., about 0.11 for the ordered probit and 0.09 for 
OLS. This net coefficient is marginally significantly different from zero 
(ordered probit p-value: 0.099; OLS p-value: 0.095). A full set of estimates is 
shown in Table 1. 
 Table 1. Dependent variable: overall rating.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Price) -0.047 -0.061 -0.038 -0.048







Observations 5986 5972 5986 5972
R 2/pseudo-R 2 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.005




    In sum, we find a non-negative relationship between price and overall rating 
for experts. Due to the marginal significance of the price coefficient for experts, 
it remains an open question whether this coefficient is positive, but our results 
indicate that this is in fact the case. 
        How large are these price effects? The coefficients are of a moderate 
magnitude, but non-negligible, given that wine prices cover a large range. In 
this sample alone, prices range from $1.65 to $150. In wine markets in general, 
the range is even larger. Suppose we have two wines, A and B, and Wine A 
costs ten times more then Wine B in dollar terms. In terms of a 100 point scale 
(such as that used by Wine Spectator), the OLS estimation of Model 2 predicts 
that non-experts will assign an overall rating that is four points lower for wine 
A, whereas experts will assign an overall rating that is seven points higher.
5
        In addition, the expert dummy is negative, quite sizable, and statistically 
significant (OLS expert dummy coefficient: -0.448; p-value: 0.001). In other 
words, the OLS estimation of Model 2 consists of two linear relationships, one 
with a higher intercept but a negative slope and one with a lower intercept but a 
positive slope. The point where the two lines cross each other is the price level 
at which experts and non-experts are expected to assign the same rating. If we 
take the model literally, this point occurs at the price of $25.70, i.e., ln(price) = 
                                                 
5 If the dollar price increases by a factor of 10, ln(price) increases by about 2.3. Hence the 
predicted effect on the overall rating of tenfold increase in the dollar price is 2.3 times the 
ln(price) coefficient for non-experts and experts, respectively, adjusted to a 100 point scale. approx. 3.25. At this price, the model predicts that both groups will assign a 
rating of about 2.2. Below this price, the model predicts that experts will assign 
lower ratings to a wine than non-experts, and vice versa. 
    We also test a third model, including individual fixed effects. In terms of the 
linear specification, Model 3 can be written as 
                i j i i j ij EXPERT P P y ε β β δ β + + + + = * ) ln( ) ln( 2 1 0                  (3) 
    where δj is a dummy for each individual taster. Including individual fixed 
effects has very little effect on the qualitative results and the minor differences 
only serve to reinforce our earlier conclusions, as both the negative effect for 
non-experts and the positive effect for experts become slightly stronger. These 
results are presented in Table 2. For each of the four regressions in Table 2, a 
Wald test rejects that the fixed effects are jointly equal to zero, by a wide 
margin (p-value < 0.001), suggesting that this is a suitable addition to the 
model. 
 
Table 2. Individual fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Price) -0.070 -0.089 -0.050 -0.064
(0.007)*** (0.001)*** (0.009)*** (0.002)***
ln(Price)*Expert 0.209 0.151
(0.011)** (0.013)**
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2.487 2.183
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
Observations 5986 5972 5986 5972
R 2/pseudo-R 2 0.080 0.081 0.181 0.182




    To make sure that our results are not driven by wines at the extreme ends of 
the price distribution, we also run our regressions on a reduced sample, omitting 
the top and bottom deciles of the price distribution. Given the broad range of 
prices in the sample, this is an appropriate precaution. The remaining wines 
range in price from $6 to $15.     Using the reduced sample, we estimate Model 2 with and without individual 
fixed effects. Doing so produces consistent and even more pronounced 
estimates. The coefficient on price is still negative, and in each case larger than 
when using the full sample. The statistical significance of the coefficients 
improves further, and the R-squared is higher. These estimates are presented in 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Reduced sample
1, with and without individual fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Price) -0.225 -0.173 -0.182 -0.122
(0.001)*** (0.019)** (0.001)*** (0.025)**
ln(Price)*Expert 0.523 0.515 0.421 0.364
(0.002)*** (0.006)*** (0.002)*** (0.009)***
Expert -1.301 -1.044
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
Individual fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Constant 2.622 1.910
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
Observations 4817 4817 4817 4817
R 2/pseudo-R 2 0.003 0.094 0.007 0.206
Robust p-values in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%




    In sum, we use the reduced sample to check the robustness of our results with 
regard to mid-range price levels. Based on the above, we conclude that our 
results are not only robust but in fact even more pronounced when omitting 
observations at the extremes of the price distribution. 
 
Conclusion 
        The pleasure we get from consuming wine depends both on its intrinsic 
qualities such as taste and smell and external attributes such as price and 
presentation. One may argue that the former influences our subjective 
appreciation through a bottom-up process, where the sensory apparatus plays a key role, and that the latter works through a top-down process, where beliefs 
and expectations about quality are important determinants.
6
    In this paper we have explored the bottom-up effects, by looking at how 
participants in blind tastings rate wines. We find that, unless they are experts, 
individuals who are unaware of the price enjoy more expensive wines slightly 
less. 
    There is a large relevant literature related to marketing. Lee et al. (2006) look 
at how knowledge of a beer's ingredients (normal beer with added vinegar) can 
affect subjective appreciation. They show that the timing of the information 
plays a substantial role. One group of tasters is told about the vinegar, tastes the 
beer, and assigns ratings. A second group is told about the vinegar after tasting 
the beer, but before the ratings are assigned. On average, individuals in the first 
group assign significantly lower ratings, suggesting that informing participants 
about the vinegar influences the experience in itself. Using fMRI, McClure et 
al. (2004) find that having the subject's favourite brand's name on a drink makes 
it taste better than if it is unlabeled. In another fMRI study, Plassmann et al. 
(2008) test whether marketing actions such as changes in the price can 
influence the experienced pleasantness of a product such as wine. Testers are 
given different wines that they are told differ in price. In reality, some of the 
wines are the same but simply presented with different prices. Prices are found 
to correlate positively with experienced pleasantness, measured through both 
subjective reports and fMRI scans. 
    Marketing provides one channel through which consumers can be influenced 
to buy certain wines. But it is not the only one: wine critics/experts may also 
play a role in affecting wine prices and shaping consumer preferences. For 
example, Hadj Ali et al. (2007) find a positive effect of wine critic Robert 
Parker's ratings on the price of Bordeaux wine. 
    There is, however, some research expressing scepticism towards wine ratings 
and their use for the average wine drinker. According to Quandt (2007), many 
wine ratings do not actually convey any information, nor is there substantial 
                                                 
6 This, in turn, might depend on ulterior motives such as status concerns. Wine as a status 
signal, and the prospect that expensive wine could function as a positional good, is discussed in 
Goldstein (2008), chapter 5. agreement in ratings by experts. Consistent with this view, Weil (2007) 
investigates whether wine descriptions of experts actually convey any 
information to wine consumers. This is tested by having testers match wine 
descriptions to wines. In a similar setup to Weil (2001, 2005), tasters are asked 
to distinguish the odd one out of three different glasses of wine. Only about 
50% of the participants can distinguish the odd one out, and of those that 
manage to do it, only about half can correctly match a wine critic's description 
of the wine with the wine itself – which is no better than a random guess. 
    Our results indicate another reason for why the average wine drinker may not 
benefit from expert wine ratings: he or she simply doesn't like the same types of 
wines as experts. This is consistent with Weil (2001, 2005), who finds that even 
among the subset of tasters who can distinguish between good and bad 
vintages, or reserve or regular bottlings, they are as likely to prefer the “better” 
one as the “worse” one. 
    These findings raise an interesting question: is the difference between the 
ratings of experts and non-experts due to an acquired taste? Or is it due to an 
innate ability, which is correlated with self-selection into wine training?
7 
Investigating this further would be a fruitful avenue for future research. 
        In sum, in a large sample of blind tastings, we find that the correlation 
between price and overall rating is small and negative. Unless they are experts, 
individuals on average enjoy more expensive wines slightly less. Our results 
suggest that both price tags and expert recommendations may be poor guides 
for non-expert wine consumers who care about the intrinsic qualities of the 
wine. 
 
                                                 
7 For a further discussion, see Chapter 4 of Goldstein (2008). References 
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